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I. INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) allows aliens to bring tort
actions in the United States federal district courts to redress
wrongs "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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the United States."2 Although the law is nearly as old as our
nation, it was largely unknown and unused until the late twenti-
eth century. The ATCA now forms the backbone of many of the
human rights cases heard in the United States district courts.
This note addresses a novel attempt to construe environmental
degradation in foreign jurisdictions as a tort committed against
aliens in violation of the law of nations. If successful, this strategy
would inject a new species of tort into the scope of the ATCA -
territory historically occupied by acts such as piracy, slave trad-
ing, torture, war crimes, and the wartime seizure of ships.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Eight residents of Ilo, Peru, representing themselves and
deceased Ilo residents, filed personal injury claims against the
Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York under the ATCA.3
The plaintiffs contended that SPCC's mining and smelting activi-
ties were responsible for their (and their decedents') acute asthma
and lung disease.
4
SPCC is a United States corporation headquartered in Ari-
zona, with its principal place of operations in Peru.' It has been
operating in and around Ilo since 1960.6 SPCC's mining, refining,
and smelting "operations emit large quantities of sulfur dioxide
and very fine particles of heavy metals into the local air and
water."7 The residents claim this pollution violates the "law of
nations" because it breaches their rights to life, health, and sus-
tainable development.'
SPCC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim, and alternatively on the grounds of forum
non conveniens s The district court dismissed the complaint, hold-
2. Id.
3. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 512-13 (E.D.N.Y.
2002).
4. See id. at 512.
5. See Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003).
"[SPCC] is majority-owned by Asarco Incorporated... a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Peru. Asarco is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Grupo
Mexico, S.A. de C.V., which is a Mexican corporation with its principal place of
business in Mexico City." Id.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 144.
9. See Flores, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
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ing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ATCA
because the plaintiffs did not show that emitting harmful pollu-
tion within a nation's borders violates "well-established, univer-
sally recognized norms of international law."" Since the plaintiffs
failed to plead a violation of customary international law, the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.1
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim the district court erred by: 1)
declining to recognize customary international law rights to life
and health, 2 2) refusing to accept the proffered sources of custom-
ary international law, and 3) concluding that Peru would serve as
an adequate alternative forum."3
This note will first discuss the genesis and the evolution of the
ATCA. Next, it will examine cases relied upon by the Second Cir-
cuit in Flores, as well as the analytical framework employed by
the Second Circuit. Additionally, this note will analyze the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision, applying the framework employed by that
court to each of the plaintiffs' assertions. Finally, this note will
discuss the correctness and significance of the decision as a limit
to federal jurisdiction in this evolving area of U.S. and interna-
tional law.
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act
The relevant provision of the ATCA reads as follows: "[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."14 The language of the
ATCA is derived from the Judiciary Act of 1789.11 Primarily
because the ATCA lacks a legislative history, 6 divergent opinions
regarding the ATCA's purpose and scope have arisen. As a result,
the following two basic positions have emerged: (1) the "original-
ist" theory, 17 which restricts application of the ATCA to a narrow
10. Id. at 525.
11. See id.
12. Flores, 343 F.3d at 144, fn.3. On appeal, the plaintiffs dropped their claim to a
"right to sustainable development".
13. See Flores, 343 F.3d at 147-48. On appeal, the court did not reach the forum
non conveniens issue. See id. at 172.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
15. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, sec. 9, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789).
16. See William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the "Originalists", 19 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 221, 222 (1996).
17. See id.
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set of wrongs that existed at the time the law was enacted, and (2)
the "evolving" theory, which states that the ATCA creates a pri-
vate right of action for violations of customary international law
as it has evolved through the years.
Judge Bork expressed the originalist theory in his concurring
opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic."s Judge Bork's view
is that claims under the ATCA are limited to those torts that vio-
lated the "law of nations" when Congress enacted the legislation
in 1789.19 At that time in history, the ATCA would have reached
claims of piracy, offenses against ambassadors, and claims arising
under prize (the law governing the wartime capture of vessels at
sea).2" Thus, the originalist theory would exclude the human
rights cases that have formed the bulk of ATCA litigation.2
The evolving theory rejects the notion that, for purposes of the
ATCA, international law was frozen in 1789.22 Proponents of the
evolving theory assert that courts should evaluate international
law as it has evolved and exists today.2" Under this new standard,
the ATCA is construed broadly to remedy all torts in violation of
continually evolving conceptions of customary international law.
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether
the ATCA encompasses claims under static or evolving interpreta-
tions of customary international law.24 The Second Circuit follows
the evolving theory in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala25 and Kadic v.
Karadzic,26 the seminal cases interpreting the elements of custom-
ary international law (discussed in detail below). The evolving
18. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
19. Dodge, supra note 16, at 223.
20. See id.
21. "It is important to remember that in 1789 there was no concept of
international human rights; neither was there, under the traditional version of
customary international law, any recognition of a right of private parties to recover."
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring).
22. "[Elvolving standards of international law govern who is within the [Alien
Tort Act's] jurisdiction." Amereda Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830
F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. "It is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789,
but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today." Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d. Cir. 1980).
24. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003).
25. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
26. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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theory is also followed in the Ninth27 and Eleventh Circuits."
However, the D.C. Circuit criticizes the broad, inclusive interpre-
tation of the ATCA. In the 2003 case of Al Odah v. United States,
Judge Randolph insisted that "[tihe meaning of §1350 has been an
open question in [the D.C. Circuit]."29
Judge Randolph's concurring opinion in Al Odah" and con-
curring opinions by Judge Bork and Judge Robb in Tel-Oren reject
the prevailing view "that the ATCA creates a private right of
action for violations of United States treaties or customary inter-
national law."3' Judge Randolph criticizes the modern ATCA
interpretation as "grant[ing] aliens greater rights in the nation's
courts than American citizens enjoy," " because absent authoriz-
ing legislation, individuals may not sue for treaty violations
unless a treaty is self-executing.3 Moreover, Judge Randolph
believes the prevailing ATCA construction impermissibly usurps
Congressional authority by granting the federal courts the power
to define international law.' Thus, "t]he rejection of Filartiga's
understanding of the ATCA by two of the three judges on the Tel-
Oren panel suggests that the law of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit stands in contrast to that of [the Second Circuit] and of the
other Circuits that have followed... Filartiga.""
B. Modern Conception of the ATCA
The ATCA was largely unknown until 1980, when the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case of Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala," which one commentator has referred to as the "Brown v.
27. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); John Doe I v. Unocal Corp. 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. 2002), rehearing granted, at 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2003).
28. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
29. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145-47 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph,
J., concurring).
30. See id.
31. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2003); see Al
Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145-47 (Randolph, J., concurring); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 826 (Robb,
J., concurring).
32. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1146.
33. Id.; see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808-10 (Bork, J., concurring).
34. "Article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
'define and punish.. .Offenses against the Law of Nations'.. .Yet under Filartiga, it is
the courts, not Congress who decide [what international law is and what violations of
it ought to be cognizable in the courts]." Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1147.
35. Flores, 343 F.3d at 151.
36. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980).
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Board of Education of international human rights."37 In Filartiga,
the court held that torture perpetrated under the color of official
authority violated "universally accepted norms" of international
law." As a result, an alien may bring an action against an alleged
torturer in federal district court under the ATCA when the alleged
torturer is served with process inside the United States.39
In Filartiga, Paraguayan citizens (the Filartigas) filed suit in
the Eastern District of New York against a fellow Paraguayan citi-
zen, Americo Norberto Pena-Irala (Pena).40 The Filartigas alleged
that Pena, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay,
tortured their seventeen-year-old son Joelito to death.41 Joelito
was kidnapped on March 29, 1976.42 Later that day, Joelito's sis-
ter, Dolly, was taken to Pena's home where Joelito's body was on
display.' Pena chased Dolly as she fled the home, shouting,
"[h]ere you have what you have been looking for so long and what
you deserve. Now shut up."" The Filartigas contended in their
complaint that Joelito was tortured and killed in retaliation for
his father's opposition to the government.45
Pena subsequently entered the United States under a visitor's
visa.46 Dolly Filartiga, who was living in Washington, D.C. at the
time, learned of Pena's presence and informed the Immigration
and Naturalization Service.47 Deportation proceedings were pend-
ing when Dolly served Pena with a complaint alleging wrongful
death by torture, and seeking compensatory and punitive dam-
ages of $10,000,000.41 Pena moved to dismiss the complaint on the
37. Michael Dwayne Pettyjohn, Bring Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Egregious
Torts Yearning to See Green: The Alien Tort Statute, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 513,
513 (2003)(citing William Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INVL L. 687, 687 (2002)).






44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 878-79.
48. See id. at 879. The Filartigas alleged a cause of action "arising under
'wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights; the U.N. Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices
constituting the customary international law of human rights and the law of nations,
'...Jurisdiction is claimed under the general federal question provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and ... under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350."' Id.
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grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and forum non con-
veniens.49 The district court, in granting Pena's motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, narrowly construed "law of
nations" under § 1350 as "excluding that law which governs a
state's treatment of its own citizens." °
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Court
first reasserted that the ATCA provides a private right of action
for aliens to address violations of customary international law or
of a treaty of the United States."1 Since the Filartigas were not
U.S. citizens, and their claim involved a tort, the issue in the case
was whether the Filartigas had satisfied the remaining statutory
requirement of alleging a violation of "the law of nations". The
Court concluded that the Filartigas had met this requirement.
The "law of nations", or customary international law, "may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly
on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or
by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."52 For a
norm to rise to the level of customary international law, it must be
commonly embraced by the "general assent of civilized nations." "
A principle of customary international law exists where "the
nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express
international accords."54
The 1995 case of Kadic v. Karadzic expanded the reach of the
ATCA beyond wrongs committed by state actors, and held that the
ATCA also encompassed claims brought against private individu-
als.5 In Kadic, Muslim and Croat citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina
brought an ATCA action against Radovan Karadzic, President of a
self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzego-
vina.56 The plaintiffs claimed that they, along with those they rep-
49. See id. As to the forum non conveniens defense, Pena submitted an affidavit of
his counsel ensuring that "Paraguayan law provides a full and adequate civil remedy
for the wrong alleged." Id.
50. Id. at 880.
51. See id. at 878.
52. Id. at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
53. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900).
54. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (quoting IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (1975)).
55. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). 'We do not agree that the
law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action.
Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals." Id.
56. See id. at 236-37.
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resented, suffered various atrocities such as rape, forced
prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execu-
tion at the hands of Karadzic and his forces.5 7 Karadzic answered
that as a private individual not acting under the color of a state's
law, he could not violate customary international law. 8 There-
fore, it was argued that the federal court did not have jurisdiction
over the case because the plaintiffs did not state a cause of action
under the ATCA.59 The district court agreed with Karadzic and
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."° In so
holding, the district court concluded that the faction that Karadzic
represented in the Bosnian civil war was not a recognized state;
therefore, Karadzic did not act under the color of a recognized
state law. 1 Furthermore, the district court reasoned that since
"acts committed by non-state actors do not violate the law of
nations,"62 the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements of the
ATCA.6
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, citing several
sources affirmatively supporting individual liability for violations
of customary international law. The court noted that prohibitions
against slavery and the slave trade, as well as certain war crimes,
have been recognized as applicable to individuals,"4 and the U.S.
Supreme Court has decided that the law of nations is applicable to
private individuals who commit acts of piracy.65 This interpreta-
tion by the U.S. Supreme Court is bolstered by a 1795 opinion of
Attorney General Bradford, which approved of the application of
the ATCA to individuals "aiding the French fleet to plunder Brit-
ish property off the coast of Sierra Leone."66 The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law buttresses the positions taken by
the U.S. Supreme Court and Attorney General Bradford by assert-
57. See id.
58. See id. at 239.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 237.
61. See id.
62. Id. (quoting Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
63. The District Court also held that the absence of state action barred plaintiffs'
claim under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §1350
(1991)) which "requires that an individual defendant act 'under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation'" 28 U.S.C. § 2(a)(19
9 1); see Karadzic,
70 F.3d at 238.
64. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239.
65. See id. (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820); United States v.
Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1820); The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844)).
66. Id. (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)).
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ing that "[ilndividuals may be held liable for offenses against
international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide." 7
Despite these recognitions of a broader view of the scope of
the ATCA, Karadzic advanced a narrow construction of Filartiga,
wherein only official torture was violative of the law of nations."
The Second Circuit responded that under the facts of Filartiga, it
was only faced with a defendant who allegedly committed official
torture.69 Thus, the Second Circuit had no occasion to consider
whether private acts would be covered under the ATCA, though
nothing in the decision precluded this result.7"
C. Customary International Law
As developed in Filartiga, Karadzic, and their progeny, the
concept of customary international law appears to be relatively
straightforward. For a principle to become incorporated into cus-
tomary international law, it must be an unambiguous, well-recog-
nized principle, universally adhered to by the States out of a sense
of legal obligation, that addresses a mutual, and not merely sev-
eral, concern of the States.7 However, beyond this veneer of sim-
plicity lies a tangled thicket of complicated qualifiers and
questions. The question of how a principle attains universal
acceptance and accession out of legal obligation arises. Followed
by that question is differentiating between a concern that is
mutual among the States as opposed to one that is merely several
among the States. Finally, one must ask what evidence is to be
considered in making these determinations? The next section will
explore the elements underlying customary international law, and
will develop an analytical framework within which to examine the
Flores case.
The first premise of customary international law centers
around the notion that the principle must be well established and
universally abided by. In The Paquete Habana,72 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the customary prohibition against war-
time seizure of coastal fishing vessels had attained the "general
assent of civilized nations," and thus had ripened from custom and
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. 2 introductory note (1986).
68. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2003);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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usage among nations into a "settled rule of international law.""
The requirement of universal assent is essential in preventing
individual nations from "impos [ing] idiosyncratic legal rules upon
others, in the name of applying international law."74 However,
universal acceptance does not require universal success in imple-
menting and enforcing the rule. Nevertheless, the principle
asserted must be firmly rooted and not "merely professed or
aspirational".
75
Although universal recognition is necessary, it does not in
itself suffice to create a norm of customary international law. An
additional requirement imposed is that States must universally
accede to the principle out of a sense of legal obligation.7" Based
upon this requisite, a principle that is adopted solely for moral or
political reasons does not qualify as one that is acceded to out of a
legal obligation.77 This rule prevents broad statements of policy,
however laudable, from binding individual States under the ban-
ner of customary international law. This means that some posi-
tions may enjoy universal moral and/or political acceptance, yet
fall short of being considered a norm of customary international
law because they are not derived from a legal obligation. The
stringent requirements for becoming a principle rooted in custom-
ary international law are also intended to prevent transitory polit-
ical ideals from becoming entrenched in the law of nations.
Although bare moral principles and political ideals unsupported
by legal obligation may eventually ripen into customary interna-
tional law, they must nevertheless legally bind States before they
can achieve customary international law status.
Customary international law only applies to evils that are of
mutual, not several, concern to States.78 Essentially, this suggests
that simply because States universally condemn an act in their
domestic law does not mean that the act is a violation of custom-
73. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694).
74. Id. Accord, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)),
wherein the U.S. Supreme Court refused to address the legitimacy of Cuba's seizure
of foreign-owned private property following the communist revolution because of the
absence of universal consensus on the issue of expropriation of private property by
governmental entities.
75. Flores, 343 F.3d at 155.
76. See id. at 154-55 (quoting Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,
307-08 (2d Cir. 2000), "Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See id. at 155.
78. See id. at 155-56.
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ary international law. 9 In ITT v. Vencap, Ltd.,8° Judge Friendly
described customary international law as "standards, rules or cus-
toms (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for
their common good and/or in dealings inter se."1 Accordingly, the
common interest of States must be implicated. The mutual con-
cern requirement is best explained by way of the classic example
used by the court in Flores- murder. Every nation proscribes mur-
der, but murder does not fall within the orbit of the ATCA because
the "'nations of the world' have not demonstrated that this wrong
is 'of mutual, and not merely several, concern."'"2 On the other
hand, some forms of murder, such as extrajudicial killing and
genocide, would be covered under the ATCA. These crimes against
humanity are universally regarded as a mutual concern among
civilized nations, "capable of impairing international peace and
security.""2
D. Sources of Customary International Law
There must be concrete evidence of customs and practices
that demonstrate universal accession to the principle out of a
sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.' The hierarchy of
sources of customary international law is laid out in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice5 , to which the
79. See id.
80. Itt v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d. Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 1015.
82. Flores, 343 F.3d at 157-58 (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888).
83. Id. at 156.
84. See id. at 160.
85. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 38 & 59,
Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
Article 38.
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Art. 59.
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.
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United States and all members of the United Nations are par-
ties.86 These sources, authoritatively cited by the Filartiga court,
and followed by the Flores court, are as follows: (a) international
conventions, (b) international custom, (c) general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations, (d) judicial decisions and scholarly
works as a subsidiary means of determining rules of law.87 Pri-
mary consideration must be given to formal lawmaking and offi-
cial State action, while the works of scholars receive only
secondary consideration.8 Broad, amorphous statements of prin-
ciple that do not set forth clear and unambiguous rules are inade-
quate to establish a principle of customary international law. 9
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The analytical framework derived from ATCA jurisprudence
and employed by the Flores court provides the background for an
analysis of the the Second Circuit's decision in Flores.
A. Plaintiffs' "Egregiousness" Standard
Plaintiffs argued for an alternative to the traditional ATCA
analysis announced in Filartiga; they proposed that courts "make
a factual inquiry into whether the allegations rise to the level of
egregiousness and intentionality required to state a claim under
international law."90 The "shockingly egregious" standard is an
attempt to circumvent the "mutual rather than merely several
concern" requirement by elevating some torts to the level of cus-
tomary international law purely based upon the severity of the
act." The court rejected this argument as "entirely inconsistent
with [its] understanding of customary international law".2
The court went on to add that the proposed "shockingly egre-
gious" standard could not form the basis for an ATCA claim unless
the behavior also violated an unambiguous principle of customary
86. See Flores, 343 F.3d at 156.
87. See id. (quoting the ICJ Statute, supra note 84 at 24-25).
88. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2003). Discussing the
secondary role of scholars as a source of customary international law, the Yousef court
notes that no individual or group of international law scholars can authoritatively
create law consistent with our democratic process and the rule of law. The Yousef
court similarly discounted the use of the Restatement (Third) and other treatises as
primary sources of customary international law. "Such works at most provide
evidence of the practice of States". Id. at 99.
89. See Flores, 343 F.3d at 163.
90. Flores, 253 F.Supp. 2d at 522.
91. Flores, 343 F.3d at 159.
92. Id.
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international law.9" The plaintiffs' standard would substitute the
district court's conception of "shocking and egregious" conduct for
that of the consensus of nations that now forms the basis of cus-
tomary international law.94 The standard advocated by the plain-
tiffs would also impermissibly broaden the content of customary
international law from matters of mutual concern between
nations to any number of matters that a court could consider egre-
gious, including matters of merely several concern. 5 Moreover,
the proposed standard would dilute the "clear and unambiguous"
requirement for a principle of customary international law; "egre-
gious" behavior is an inherently subjective concept susceptible to
an infinite number of interpretations."
B. Evaluation of Plaintiffs' Broad Claim That Rights
to Life And Health Are Principles Established By
Customary International Law.
Life and health are "abstract rights and liberties devoid of dis-
cernable standards and regulations;"97 they are "only nebulous
notions that are infinitely malleable." 9 Thus, the court held that
the rights to life and health are "insufficiently definite to consti-
tute rules of customary international law."99 These so-called
rights are inherently vague, and fall short of being the type of
clear and unambiguous rules required by Filartiga.'0  At best,
these abstract "rights" constitute well-intended social or moral
conceptions which are inappropriate sources of customary inter-
national law because they do not suggest an intention by the
States to be legally bound to anything. 1
93. Id. at 159.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 159-60.
96. Id.
97. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).
98. Flores, 343 F.3d at 161.
99. Id. at 160.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 161.
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C. Evaluation of Plaintiffs' Narrow Claim That
Customary International Law Prohibits Intra-
national Pollution; Analysis of Each of Plaintiffs'
Proposed Sources Supporting Their Claim.
a. Treaties, Conventions, and Covenants
Treaties, conventions, and covenants are appropriate pieces of
evidence of customary international law in that they confirm a
State's intent to become legally bound, thereby demonstrating
assent to a principle out of a sense of legal duty.02 Treaties rati-
fied by at least two states provide some evidence of custom and
practice, but to provide proof of customary international law, the
treaty must be ratified and consistently adhered to by a critical
mass of States.' In short, treaties provide proof of assent out of a
sense of legal obligation, but do not satisfy the universal recogni-
tion prong until "an overwhelming majority of States have ratified
the treaty, and . . . [have] uniformly and consistently act[ed] in
accordance with its principles." 4
The evidentiary weight given to treaties is determined not
only by the number of ratifying nations, but also by consideration
as to which nations have ratified the treaty.'0 ' The more promi-
nent the ratifying parties, the more compelling the argument that
the principles embodied in the treaty are indeed bona fide rules of
customary international law." 6 Evidentiary weight given to trea-
ties also varies according to the degree with which States take
concrete action to implement and actually abide by the treaties.
Treaties that give rise to tangible acts of States are accorded far
more weight than treaties that have not led to discernable State
acts in furtherance of the principles contained within them.
The latter treaties are less reliable markers of universally
recognized principles because at the margins they begin to resem-
ble mere statements of policy or aspirational documents, rather
than legally binding treaties. By way of example, in the United
102. See id. at 162.
103. See id. at 162-63.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 163.
106. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003), A...it s highly
unlikely that a purported principle of customary international law in direct conflict
with the recognized practices and customs of the United States and/or other
prominent players in the community of States could be deemed to qualify as a bona
fide customary international law principle."
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States, a treaty that is either self-executing ("those that immedi-
ately create rights and duties of private individuals which are
enforceable") ' " or that is executed by an Act of Congress, is a more
reliable indicator of the customs and practices of the U.S. than a
treaty that is merely ratified and unexecuted. 0 8 The latter is form
over substance, and as such is indistinguishable from a mere
aspirational statement.
The plaintiffs rely on four treaties as evidence of a consensus
proscribing intra-national pollution to a degree that is cognizable
in customary international law: (1) the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 09 (2) the American Convention
on Human Rights (American Convention),1 ' (3) the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),"'
and (4) the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child." '
The United States has only ratified one of the cited treaties,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."' The
language relied upon asserts that every human has a right to life
which shall be protected by law, and of which he shall not be arbi-
trarily deprived.1 1 4 The ICCPR has been ratified by 148 nations,
but the United States ratified it with numerous reservations
aligning the treaty obligations with Constitutional require-
ments."' Moreover, the U.S. ratified the treaty with the express
declaration that it is not self-executing; thus, the treaty is not a
reliable indicator of actual U.S. practice because it "does not cre-
ate a private cause of action in United States courts."" '1 Even if
the treaty were self-executing, and did represent an international
consensus, the ideal expressed is insufficiently definite to serve as
107. Flores, 343 F.3d at 163 (quoting Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Comment: The Doctrine
of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892,
896-96 (1980)).
108. See id. at 163.
109. Id. (citing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
110. Id. at 164 (citing the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123).
111. Id. (citing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3).
112. Id. at 165 (citing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/441
25 (1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3).
113. See id. at 163.
114. See id. at 164 (quoting ICCPR, supra note 108, at art. 6(1)).
115. See id.
116. Id.
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a rule of customary international law.11 As discussed above, the
"right to life" is simply too ambiguous.
The other three treaties cited by plaintiffs suffer the same
infirmity-the rights purportedly generated are simply too aspira-
tional. The American Convention on Human Rights contains the
same broad "right to life" language, and has not been ratified by
the United States."'8 The unratified International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "instructs States parties to
take the steps necessary for 'the improvement of all aspects of
environmental and industrial hygiene'"19 While this treaty does
tangentially address the topic of pollution, it provides no concrete
instruction regarding what levels of pollution are acceptable, and
consequently is merely a vague statement of principle. 2' Simi-
larly, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child addresses
environmental pollution, but also fails to establish any finite
parameters or regulatory standards. 2' Again, the lack of any evi-
dence of clear and unambiguous rules that States abide by out of
legal obligation defeats the plaintiffs' assertion that this treaty
language is evidence of customary international law.
b. Non-Binding General Assembly Declarations
The plaintiffs proffer numerous United Nations General
Assembly resolutions to support their claim that SPCC violated
rules of customary international law. However, these documents
are insufficient as sources of customary international law because
they do not go beyond representing an ideal to aspire to; they are
not intended to legally bind UN member states.2 2 In the UN's
formative years, proposals to confer binding status on General
Assembly declarations were specifically rejected, 23 leaving the




121. See id. at 164-65. The unratified treaty "instructs States to 'take appropriate
measures.. to combat disease and malnutrition,. .through the provision of adequate
nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and
risks of environmental pollution.'"
122. See id. at 165.
123. See id. The issue was extensively considered and rejected at the 1944
Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, D.C., at the 1945 Yalta Conference, and
at the 1945 United Nations Founding Conference in San Francisco. See id. (citing
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 248, 269 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed.
2002)).
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body as "the world's most important political discussion forum."
1 24
The organ of the United Nations vested with the power to produce
binding resolutions is the Security Council; 1'25 the output of the
General Assembly is limited to "recommendations to the Members
of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both.1126
Such declarations may develop into customary international law,
but only if State practice follows out of a sense of legal obliga-
tion."' Here, the General Assembly's declarations presented by
the plaintiffs are advisory in nature, and do not describe actual
State customs and practices motivated by legal obligation. 12
c. Other Multinational Declarations of Principle
The plaintiffs also advance numerous multinational "declara-
tions" (made by a multinational body, or by one or more States) to
support their claim of SPCC's violation of customary international
law. '29 These are typically statements of a political principle,
espoused by a nation or group of nations, that fail to describe the
type of universally recognized legal obligations required to consti-
tute a rule of customary international law.' 0 The two declarations
relied upon by the plaintiffs (the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man,' 3 ' and Principle 1 of the Rio Declara-
tion)"' are both inadequate because they (1) profess mere aspira-
tional principles, (2) create no enforceable obligations, and (3)
provide no indication that the declaring States intended to be
legally bound.'3 Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that
these declarations fail as evidence of customary international law.
124. Id. (quoting The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 248, 269
(Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002)).
125. See id. at 167 (citing Dolivet, The United Nations: A Handbook on the New
World Organization 35, at 45-57 (1946)).
126. Id. (quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 10).
127. See id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883, "'a [United Nations] declaration
may by custom become recognized as [a] rule[ ]' of customary international law.. non-
binding United Nations documents.. .'create[ ] an expectation of adherence,' but they
evidence customary international law only 'insofar as the expectation is gradually
justified by State practice.'")
128. See id. at 168.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 169 (citing the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEAISer. LV!
1.4 Rev. (1965)).
132. See id. (citing Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration, 31 I.L.M. 874).
133. See id.
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d. Decisions of Multinational Tribunals
The plaintiffs also rely on decisions of the International Court
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.' However,
neither of these tribunals may render decisions that create bind-
ing norms of customary international law.35 Article 59 of the ICJ
Statute unambiguously limits the force of its decisions to the par-
ties involved, and to the specific matter addressed."6 Similarly,
the European Court of Human Rights is not empowered to create
customary international law norms.'37 It only has jurisdiction to
interpret and apply provisions of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; there-
fore, its decisions are only applicable to its regional signatories. 38
Moreover, the ICJ Statute lists judicial decisions as secondary, not
primary sources of customary international law.'39 The decisions
of these tribunals may be considered as subsidiary evidence of cus-
tomary international law rules to the degree that the opinions are
consistent with existing State practices undertaken out of legal
obligation, but here the tribunals were not even addressing intra-
national pollution of the sort complained of.
40
e. Expert Affidavits
The plaintiffs introduced many expert affidavits to support
their contention that intranational pollution violates well-estab-
lished rules of international law.'4' The Second Circuit agreed
with the district court and "declined to afford evidentiary weight
to these [writings]."' In The Paquete Habana, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that expert writings may be considered as a source of
customary international law, but expert commentators may be
relied upon solely as evidence of what the law already is, not as
speculation of what a particular author thinks the law should
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 169-70 (quoting the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 1055. "the decisions of the Court have no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of the particular case').
137. See id. at 169.
138. See id. at 170 (citing European Convention art. 32, "the Court's jurisdiction
'extends to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the
Convention").
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be.14 In accord with this decision, Article 38 of the ICJ Statute
instructs courts to consult expert writings as a secondary source
only,'" implying that the role of scholars is to identify the law as it




A justice of England's Court of Appeals observed, "[a] s a moth
is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United
States."'46 Plaintiffs' lawyers have dusted off a seldom used, single
sentence from the Judiciary Act of 1789 and aggressively
attempted to shoehorn a case into U.S. federal court. The Second
Circuit rightly limited the ATCA to those acts, such as slavery,
piracy, and torture, that are well established, clearly defined, and
universally recognized wrongs that States prohibit out of legal
obligation. Conduct that is merely egregious cannot open the
doors of U.S. courts to foreign plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs' bar were
able to scour the globe in search of aliens to bring claims in the
U.S. tort lottery, the cost would be astronomical both in terms of
strain on the legal system, as well as in terms of economic damage
to corporate and individual defendants.
There are two possible motivations behind this attempt to
bring environmental claims under the ATCA. The first is the
pecuniary interest already alluded to. Second, there may be a
genuine attempt to use U.S. courts as a regulatory tool to effectu-
ate a de facto harmonization of international environmental
standards.
Disparity in environmental regulation among nations effec-
tively demonstrates the lack of an international consensus con-
cerning environmental standards. This disparity is a function of a
myriad of complexities, but ultimately the problem comes down to
a sovereign nation's priorities in balancing its resources with its
desire to develop economically. Clearly, there is a benefit to doing
business in the developing world because environmental regula-
143. See id. at 171 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
144. See id.; ICJ Statute, supra note 84 at art. 38.
145. See id., "neither Paquete Habana nor Article 38 recognizes as a source of
customary international law the policy-driven or theoretical work of advocates that
comprises a substantial amount of contemporary international law scholarship. Nor
do these authorities permit us to consider personal viewpoints expressed in the
affidavits of international law scholars."
146. Washington Legal Foundation, Legal Backgrounder, Court Properly Limits
Scope of Alien Tort Claims Act, January 17, 2003, quoting Smith Kline & French
Labs. Ltd. v. Block, 2 All E.R. 72, 72 (Ct. App. 1983).
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tion is typically not as stringent as in the United States or Europe.
The generally mild regulatory climate, coupled with cheap, abun-
dant natural resources and labor makes offshore operations
highly attractive. Business interests undertake some activity in
the developing world that could not occur in the United States, but
that does not mean that the doors of U.S. courts should be open to
grievances that are more appropriately addressed in the local
jurisdiction.
In the present case, SPCC was subject to Peruvian environ-
mental regulation, 147 oversight, and the jurisdiction of Peruvian
courts. 4 ' Moreover, the Peruvian government had previously
fined SPCC, required SPCC to pay restitution to area farmers for
environmental degradation, and compelled the company to "mod-
ify its operations in order to abate pollution and other environ-
mental damage." 4 ' The Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines
(MEM) ordered SPCC to conduct environmental impact studies
and to investigate the "economic feasibility of abating that
impact."5 ° In 1991, SPCC agreed to spend $135 million on envi-
ronmental projects under MEM's supervision as a condition prece-
dent to the modernization and expansion of its facilities."' Finally,
SPCC has been sued "in Peru for damages resulting from the envi-
ronmental impact of its operations." 2
Obviously, the plaintiffs consider this level of regulation and
the remedies available under Peruvian law inadequate. Indeed,
justice in the developing world (either in the form of regulatory
containment or tort damages) may or may not be available to the
degree we would expect in the United States. If that is the purpose
of developing this entry into the federal courts, the proponents of
expanded ATCA jurisdiction must now focus their efforts on the
efficacy of local regulation and local remedies.
If, on the other hand, this theory is merely intended to mint a
fresh crop of plaintiffs for the tort bar, then this decision is a vic-
tory for international business, the global economy, and local
economies which would otherwise be saddled with de facto envi-
147. Flores, 343 F.3d at 144. The Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines sets
emissions and discharge standards which SPCC is required to meet, and the company
is subject to annual or semi-annual reviews to ascertain the "impact of SPCC's




151. See id. at 144.
152. Id.
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ronmental rules not of their choosing. The United States cannot
play personal injury attorney to the world. Nor can plaintiffs'
attorneys and federal judges in the U.S. supplant the legislatures
and regulatory agencies of developing nations by effectively
imposing first world environmental standards abroad.
While the Flores decision does not explicitly restrict applica-
tion of the ATCA to international human rights, it sets a clear
boundary that, at present, environmental claimants need not
apply. However, given the fluid nature of customary international
law, it is possible that rules proscribing environmental degrada-
tion could one day emerge as an international consensus, meet the
Filartiga requirements, and become susceptible to this sort of liti-
gation. That day has not come, and until it does, redress for this
species of harm remains with the local jurisdiction under local
law.
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